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Abstract—Phishing is a major problem on the Web. Despite
the significant attention it has received over the years, there has
been no definitive solution. While the state-of-the-art solutions
have reasonably good performance, they require a large amount
of training data and are not adept at detecting phishing attacks
against new targets.
In this paper, we begin with two core observations: (a) although
phishers try to make a phishing webpage look similar to its target,
they do not have unlimited freedom in structuring the phishing
webpage; and (b) a webpage can be characterized by a small set
of key terms; how these key terms are used in different parts
of a webpage is different in the case of legitimate and phishing
webpages. Based on these observations, we develop a phishing
detection system with several notable properties: it requires
very little training data, scales well to much larger test data,
is language-independent, fast, resilient to adaptive attacks and
implemented entirely on client-side. In addition, we developed
a target identification component that can identify the target
website that a phishing webpage is attempting to mimic. The
target detection component is faster than previously reported
systems and can help minimize false positives in our phishing
detection system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Phishing webpages (“phishs”) lure unsuspecting web surfers
into revealing their credentials. As a major security concern
on the web, phishing has attracted the attention of many
researchers and practitioners. There is a wealth of literature,
tools and techniques for helping web surfers to detect and
avoid phishing webpages. Nevertheless, phishing detection
remains an arms race with no definitive solution. State-of-the-
art large scale real-time phishing detection techniques [?] are
capable of identifying phishing webpages with high accuracy
(>99%) while achieving very low rates of misclassifying
legitimate webpages (<0.1%). However, many of these tech-
niques, which use machine learning, rely on millions of
static features, primarily taking the bag-of-words approach.
This implies two major weaknesses: (a) they need a huge
amount of labeled data to train their classification models;
and (b) they are language- and brand-dependent and not
very effective at identifying new phishing webpages targeting
brands that were not already observed in previous attacks.
Commercial providers of phishing detection solutions struggle
with obtaining and maintaining labeled training data. From
the deployability perspective, solutions that require minimal
training data are thus very attractive.
In this paper, we introduce a new approach that avoids these
drawbacks. Our goal is to identify whether a given webpage
is a phish, and, if it is, identify the target it is trying to mimic.
Our approach is based on two core conjectures:
• Modeling phisher limitations: To increase their chances
of success, phishers try to make their phish mimic its
target closely and obscure any signal that might tip off the
victim. However, in crafting the structure of the phishing
webpage, phishers are restricted in two significant ways.
First, external hyperlinks in the phishing webpage, espe-
cially those pointing to the target, are to domains outside
the control of phishers. Second, while phishers can freely
change most parts of the phishing page, the latter part
of its domain name is constrained as they are limited
to domains that the phishers control. We conjecture that
by modeling these limitations in our phishing detection
classifier, we can improve its effectiveness.
• Measuring consistency in term usage: A webpage can
be represented by a collection of key terms that occur
in multiple parts of the page such as its body text, title,
domain name, other parts of the URL etc. We conjecture
that the way in which these terms are used in different
parts of the page will be different in legitimate and
phishing webpages.
Based on these conjectures, we develop and evaluate a
phishing detection system. We use comparatively few (212)
but relevant features. This allows our system, even with
very little labeled training data, to have high accuracy and
low rate of mislabeling legitimate websites. By modeling
inherent phisher limitations in our feature set, the system
is resilient to adaptive attackers who dynamically change a
phish to circumvent detection. Our basic phishing detector
component (Section IVPhishing Detection Systemsection.4)
does not require online access to centralized information and
is fast. Therefore, it is highly suited for a privacy-friendly
client-side implementation. Our target brand identification
component (Section ??) uses a simple technique to extract
a set of keyterms characterizing a webpage and, in case it
is a phish, uses the keyterms set to identify its target. Both
components eschew the bag-of-words approach and are thus
not limited to specific languages or targeted brands.
We claim the following contributions:
• a new set of features to detect phishing webpages
(Section IV-BComputing Featuressubsection.4.2) and a
classifier, built using these features, with the following
properties that distinguish it from previous work:
– it learns a generalized model of phishing and legitimate
webpages from a small training set (few thousands).
– it is language- and brand-independent.
– its features are extracted only from information re-
trieved by a web browser from the webpage and it does
not require online access to centralized information.
Hence it admits a client-side-only implementation that
offers several advantages including (a) better privacy,
(b) real-time protection and (c) resilient to phishing
webpages that return different contents to different
clients.
• comprehensive evaluation of this system, showing that
its accuracy (>99%) and misclassification rate (<0.1%)
are comparable to prior work while using significantly
smaller training data. (Section V-CPhishing Webpage
Classificationsubsection.5.3)
II. BACKGROUND
A. Phishing
Phishing refers to the class of attacks where a victim is lured
to a fake webpage masquerading as a target website and is
deceived into disclosing personal data or credentials. Phishing
campaigns are typically conducted using spam emails to drive
users to fake websites [?]. Impersonation techniques range
from technical subterfuges (email spoofing, DNS spoofing,
etc.) to social engineering. The former is used by techni-
cally skilled phishers while unskilled phishers resort to the
latter [?]. Phishing webpages mimic the look and feel of their
target websites [?]. In order to make the phishing webpages
believable, phishers may embed some content (HTML code,
images, etc.) taken directly from the target website and use
relatively little content that they themselves host [?]. This
includes outgoing links pointing to the target website. They
also use keywords referring to the target in different elements
of the phishing webpage (title, text, images, links) [?], [?],
[?], [?]. In this paper, our focus is on detection of phishing
webpages created by an attacker and hosted on his own web
server or on someone else’s compromised web server.
B. URL Structure
Webpages are addressed by a uniform resource locator
(URL). Fig. 1Structure of a URLfigure.caption.1 shows rele-
vant parts in the structure of a typical URL. It begins with the
protocol used to access the page. The fully qualified domain
name (FQDN) identifies the server hosting the webpage. It
consists of a registered domain name (RDN) and prefix which
we refer to as subdomains. A phisher has full control over the
subdomains portion and can set it to any value. The RDN
portion is constrained since it has to be registered with a
domain name registrar. RDN itself consists of two parts: a
public suffix (ps) preceded by a main level domain (mld). The
URL may also have a path and query components which,
too, can be changed by the phisher at will. We use the term
FreeURL to refer to those parts of the URL that are fully
controllable by the phisher.
protocol://[subdomains.]mld.ps[/path][?query]
FQDN
RDNFreeURL FreeURL
Fig. 1: Structure of a URL
Consider an example URL:
https://www.amazon.co.uk/ap/signin? encoding=UTF8
We can identify the following components:
• protocol = https
• FQDN = www.amazon.co.uk
• RDN = amazon.co.uk
• mld = amazon
• FreeURL = {www, /ap/signin? encoding=UTF8}
C. Data Sources
From analyzing phishing webpages, we identify the follow-
ing data sources, available to a web browser when it loads a
webpage, that can be useful in detecting phishing webpages:
• Starting URL: the URL given to the user to access the
website. It can be distributed in emails, instant messages,
websites, documents, etc.
• Landing URL: the final URL pointing to the actual
content presented to the user in his web browser. This
is the URL present in the browser address bar when the
page is completely loaded.
• Redirection chain: the set of URLs crossed to go from
the starting URL to the landing URL (including both).
• Logged links: the set of URLs logged by the browser
while loading the page. They point to sources from which
embedded content (code, images, etc.) in the webpage are
loaded.
• HTML: the HTML source code of the webpage and
IFrames included in the page. We consider four elements
extracted from this source code:
– Text: text contained between <body> HTML tags
(actually rendered on user’s display).
– Title: text contained between <title> HTML tags (ap-
pears in the browser tab title).
– HREF links: the set of URLs representing outgoing
links in the webpage.
– Copyright: the copyright notice, if any, in Text.
• Screenshot: an image capture of the loaded webpage.
III. DESIGN OVERVIEW
A. Modeling Phisher Limitations
In Section II-BURL Structuresubsection.2.2, we saw that
even on systems they control, phishers are constrained from
freely constructing URLs to pages they host. Similarly, in Sec-
tion II-APhishingsubsection.2.1, we saw that in order to max-
imize the believability of their phishing sites, phishers include
content from URLs outside their control. Thus, we divide the
data sources from Section II-CData Sourcessubsection.2.3 into
subcategories according to the level of control phishers may
have on them and the constraints on phishers.
Control: URLs from logged links and HREF links are subdi-
vided into internal and external according to their RDN. The
set of RDNs extracted from URLs involved in the redirection
chain are assumed to be under the control of the webpage
owner. Any URLs that include these RDNs are marked in-
ternal. Other RDNs are assumed to be possibly outside the
control of the webpage owner. URLs containing such RDNs
are marked external.
Constraints: Within a URL, we distinguish between RDN,
which cannot be freely defined by the webpage owner, and
(FreeURL), which can be.
B. Extracting Term Distributions
The primary technique of a phisher is essentially social
engineering: fooling a victim into believing that the phishing
webpage is the target [?]. Thus, it is plausible that lexical
analysis of the data sources will help in identifying phishing
webpages: we conjecture that legitimate webpages and phish-
ing webpages differ in the way terms are used in different
locations in those pages. To incorporate measurements of such
term usage consistency, we first define what “terms” are and
how they are extracted from a webpage. Let A be the set of
the 26 lowercase English letters: A = {a, b, c, ..., x, y, z}. We
extract terms from a data source as follows:
• canonicalize letter characters by mapping upper case
characters, accented characters and special characters to
a matching letter in A; e.g., { B, β, b`, bˆ } → b.
• split the input into substrings whenever a character c /∈ A
is encountered.
• throw away any substring whose length is less than 3.
Let T = An|n ≥ 3 be the set of all possible terms. Suppose
TS = {ti∈{1;m} ∈ T } was extracted from a data source S and
ti occurs with probability pi. The set of m pairs (ti, pi) ∈
T × ]0, 1] , i ∈ {1;m} represents the term distribution DS of
S.
TABLE I: Term distributions
Distribution Data source
Dtext Text
Dtitle Title
Dcopyright Copyright notice
Dimage Webpage screenshot
Dstart Starting URL – FreeURL
Dland Landing URL – FreeURL
Dintlog Internal logged links – FreeURL
Dintlink Internal HREF links – FreeURL
Dstartrdn Starting URL – RDN
Dlandrdn Landing URL – RDN
Dintrdn Internal links (HREF and logged) – RDN
Dextrdn External logged links – RDN
Dextlog External logged links – FreeURL
Dextlink External HREF links – FreeURL
Table ITerm distributionstable.caption.2 defines the term
distributions we consider. The external sources extrdn,
extlog, extlink are those assumed to be outside the control
of the webpage owner. RDN data sources startrdn, landrdn,
intrdn are constrained by DNS registration. The rest is
controlled by the webpage owner without constraints. The
image data source is composed of terms extracted by optical
character recognition (OCR) from the screenshot of a rendered
webpage.
C. Architecture
Our overall design consists of a phishing webpage detection
system (Section IVPhishing Detection Systemsection.4) and a
target identification system (Section ??). The phishing detec-
tion system is a classifier that identifies phishing webpages
based on a set of newly introduced features. The target
identification system identifies if a given webpage is a phish
by finding its target. Both systems can be used in a pipeline:
the phishing detection system tentatively identifies a potential
phish, which can be fed to the target identification system to
infer the purported target.
IV. PHISHING DETECTION SYSTEM
A. Feature Set Requirements
We consider some facts of phishing detection in order to
deduce requirements that a feature set must have:
Generalizability: Accumulating ground truth phishing and
legitimate data is challenging. Phishing websites have very
short lifetimes [?] and can display different content depend-
ing on a browser’s user-agent or user’s geographic location.
Labeled phishing and legitimate resources are often defined
by URLs (e.g. PhishTank1). Assigning correct labels (phish,
non-phish) to these URLs is difficult. But even if the initial
labeling was done correctly, information on the pages pointed
by them can also evolve over time: a legitimate domain name
can be hijacked to host phishing content for a while or a
phishing domain name can be parked or changed to contain
empty content after a short uptime. Therefore, crawling a set of
labeled URLs to gather ground truth data often leads to noisy
datasets that further require manual checking and cleaning up.
Thus it is desirable to select a feature set that allows a model
to be learned from as small a training set as possible while
remaining applicable to far larger test datasets. Using a much
larger test set than the training set also allows the detection
and avoidance of overfitting [?].
Adaptability: Several automated classification techniques [?],
[?], [?] rely on a static set of features learned from a training
set such as the bag-of-words model or “term frequency-inverse
document frequency” (TF-IDF) [?] computation. Such feature
models are language-dependent and vary with training sets.
Using such features shows [?] that certain terms such as
paypal are dominant features. Thus the efficacy of such models
on phishs that masquerade as previously unknown targets or
brands is questionable. In addition, phishers can adaptively
1PhishTank (https://www.phishtank.com/)
modify the content of their phish to circumvent detection by
such static models, e.g., by using words that typically occur
in legitimate webpages. An adaptable feature set must be
independent of learning instances, preferably defined manually
with motivated reasons, and be resilient to adaptive attacks.
Usability: It is desirable that features are computable on an
end user system without relying on online access to centralized
servers or proprietary data (e.g. Google PageRank). This
preserves user privacy since the scheme does not require users
to disclose their browsing history to an outside entity.
Computational Efficiency: Features must be quickly com-
putable to allow integration with real time detection systems
that do not impact users’ web surfing experience.
B. Computing Features
We now introduce 212 features and motivate their se-
lection. We intend to capture the constraints and de-
gree of control discussed earlier (Section III-AModeling
Phisher Limitationssubsection.3.1) as well as consistency
checking of term usage (Section III-BExtracting Term
Distributionssubsection.3.2). We group features into five cate-
gories (Table IIFeature setstable.caption.3).
TABLE II: Feature sets
Name Count Type
f1 106 URL
f2 66 Term usage consistency
f3 22 Usage of starting and landing mld
f4 13 RDN usage
f5 5 Webpage content
fall 212 Entire feature set
URL: First we define nine statistical features related
to the lexical composition of URLs (Table IIIURL
featurestable.caption.4). Feature 2 is meant to identify strings
in path and query that look like domain names. Phishing URL
and domain name obfuscation techniques [?] tend to produce
long URLs composed of many terms. This is the rationale for
features 3-8. The popularity rank of the domain (feature 9) is
based on a fixed, previously downloaded list of the Alexa top
million domain names2. If a domain is not in this list, feature
9 takes the default value of 1,000,001.
All nine features are extracted from the starting URL (9) and
landing URL (9). The mean, median and standard deviation
values are computed for features 3-9 on the following sets
of URLs: internal logged links, external logged links, internal
HREF links and external HREF links (4 ∗ 7 ∗ 3). Feature 1 is
computed on these sets as a ratio of URLs using https over
the total count of URLs for each set (4 ∗ 1). Feature 2 is
computed only for the starting and landing URLs. Thus, the
complete URL-based feature set (f1) consists of 106 features:
9 + 9 + 4 ∗ (7 ∗ 3 + 1) = 106.
Term usage consistency: The second set of features (f2)
captures the consistency of term usage between different
2Alexa (http://www.alexa.com/)
TABLE III: URL features
# Description
1 protocol used (http/https)
2 count of dots ‘.’ in FreeURL
3 count of level domains
4 length of the URL
5 length of the FQDN
6 length of the mld
7 count of terms in the URL
8 count of terms in the mld
9 Alexa ranking of the RDN
types (controlled vs. uncontrolled; constrained vs. uncon-
strained) of data sources in the page. Using 12 term dis-
tributions (we discard Dcopyright and Dimage) defined in
Section III-BExtracting Term Distributionssubsection.3.2 we
define 66 features (12 ∗ 11/2) depicting the similarity of pairs
of sources by computing pairwise Hellinger Distance between
their distributions. The Hellinger Distance [?] is a metric
used to quantify the dissimilarity between two probabilistic
distributions P and Q. It is an instance of f -divergence that
is symmetric and bounded in [0, 1]. The value 1 represents
complete dissimilarity (P ∩ Q = ∅) and the value 0 means
that P and Q are the same probabilistic distribution.
Usage of starting and landing mld: Legitimate websites are
likely to register a domain name reflecting the brand or the
service they represent. However, phishers often use domain
names having no relation with their target [?]. Hence, we
expect the starting mld and/or the landing mld to appear in
several sources extracted from a legitimate webpage while
phishing webpages should not have this characteristic. We
define 22 features (f3) inferring the usage of the starting
and landing mld in the text, the title and FreeURL of the
logged links and HREF links. 12 binary features are set to
1 if the starting/landing mld appear in Dtext, Dtitle, Dintlog ,
Dextlog , Dintlink or Dextlink (6*2); 10 features are the sum
of probability from terms of Dtitle, Dintlog , Dextlog, Dintlink
and Dextlink that are substrings of starting/landing mld (5*2).
Dtext is not considered since it is often composed of many
short irrelevant terms that match several parts of a mld.
RDN usage: We define 13 features (f4) related to RDN usage
consistency. We compute statistics related to the use of similar
and different RDNs in starting URL, landing URL, redirection
chain, loaded content (logged links) and HREF links. We
expect legitimate webpages to use more internal RDNs and
less redirection than phishing webpages [?].
Webpage content: Finally, five features (f5) count the number
of terms in the text and the title (2), and the number of input
fields, images and IFrames (3) in the page. Phishing pages
tend to have minimal text to circumvent text-based detection
techniques [?] and use more images and HTML content loaded
from other sources. In addition, since phishing attacks seek to
steal user data, phishing webpages often contain several input
fields [?].
It is worth noting that while we use terms to compute
our feature set, it is not based on any observed language or
term usage knowledge. The computation relies solely on the
information gathered through a web browser albeit we use a
local copy of Alexa ranking list. Hence, it makes the feature
set adaptable and usable as well as fast to compute once the
data sources are available. Since the feature set is small (212)
we expect it to have good generalizability.
C. Phishing Detection Model
To use our feature set for discriminating phishing from
legitimate webpages, we use a supervised machine learning
approach. In supervised machine learning, a classification
model is learned from observations over a set of data labeled
with several classes. The learned model is used to predict the
class of unlabeled instances. We select Gradient Boosting [?]
to build the classification model. It was selected because [?]
(a) of its strong ability to select and weight the most relevant
features and (b) boosting algorithms are known to be fairly
robust to overfitting, enabling the resulting model to have good
generalization capabilities.
Gradient Boosting predicts the class of an unknown instance
by computing values defined in [0, 1] that gives the confidence
of the instance to belong to a given class. In the case of
predicting only two classes, the confidence value v1 for one
class is equal to 1− v2, where v2 is the confidence value for
the other class. A discrimination threshold predicts, according
to the computed confidence values, the class of an instance. By
tuning this threshold, we can favor the prediction of one class
over the other. The variation of the discrimination threshold
over [0, 1] is used to evaluate the accuracy of a given model
by examining how false positive rate varies with true positive
rate (ROC) or precision varies with recall.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of the
phishing detection system and the target identification method
presented in Sections IVPhishing Detection Systemsection.4
and ?? respectively.
A. Experimental Setup
Our system is composed of five Python modules:
Webpage scraper is only required for experiments to
gather the information sources defined in Section II-CData
Sourcessubsection.2.3. It can also be used for offline anal-
ysis. The scraper is implemented as a monitored Firefox
web browser (Selenium3) that extracts the data sources while
visiting a webpage at a given URL. It saves the data in json
format and a screenshot of the webpage.
Feature extractor extracts the 212 features (Section
IV-BComputing Featuressubsection.4.2) from the data sources
in the webpage and builds a feature vector.
Classifier takes the feature vector and a previously learned
classification model as input to predict the class, phishing or
legitimate, of a webpage. The implementation of the Gradient
Boosting is provided by the Scikit Learn4 Python package.
3Selenium HQ (http://www.seleniumhq.org/)
4Scikit Learn (http://scikit-learn.org/)
Keyterms extractor infers the keyterms of a webpage using
data gathered by the scraper.
Target identifier predicts the likelihood of a webpage being a
phish. In case of a phish, the modules also identifies its target.
B. Evaluation Datasets
We obtained URLs from two sources in order to gather
ground truth data of phishing and legitimate webpages (Table
IVDatasets descriptiontable.caption.5). Neither dataset con-
tains personal data. We will make both datasets available for
research use.
The phishing URL sets (Phish) were obtained through the
community website PhishTank. We conducted three differ-
ent collection “campaigns”. The first resulted in phishTrain
which was used for training the phishing detection classifier.
The second, collected at a later point in time, resulted in
phishTest which was used as the test set. The last, phish-
Brand, was used for evaluating our target identification scheme
(Section V-DTarget Identificationsubsection.5.4). It consists
of 600 phishing webpages for each of which we manually
identified the target, resulting in a total of 126 different
targets. Each campaign consisted of checking for new entries
in PhishTank every hour and scraping the webpages for those
URLs. These are in several languages. The datasets were
further manually cleaned to remove any legitimate or unavail-
able websites and parked domain names. Table IVDatasets
descriptiontable.caption.5 provides a detailed description of
these datasets including the date and the count of elements
before and after cleaning.
TABLE IV: Datasets description
Set Name Date (2015) Initial Clean
Phish phishTrain Jul-23/Aug-3 1213 1036
phishTest Sep-13/Sep-24 1553 1216
phishBrand Sep-22/Sep-28 600 600
Leg legTrain Jul-15/Jul-22 5000 4531
English Aug-17/Sep-23 100,000 –
French Sep-28 10,000 –
German Sep-29 10,000 –
Italian Sep-30 10,000 –
Portuguese Oct-1 10,000 –
Spanish Oct-2 10,000 –
The legitimate URLs (Leg) were provided by Intel Secu-
rity5. We processed them same way as for the phishing URLs.
Intel gave us several datasets. First, an English training set
(legTrain) of 5,000 legitimate webpages was cleaned up to
remove unavailable websites and dead links. Six larger test sets
of webpages in different languages (English, French, German,
Portuguese, Italian and Spanish) were gathered and did not
receive any cleaning treatment. A detailed description of these
sets is provided in Table IVDatasets descriptiontable.caption.5
as well. The variety and popularity of the URLs in the test set
is reflected in the fact that 65,302 (43.5%) of the 150,000 test
URLs in Leg have RDNs ranked in Alexa top 1M.
5Intel Security (http://www.intelsecurity.com/)
C. Phishing Webpage Classification
We now present detailed evaluation of our phishing detec-
tion method. We focus on three primary aspects of classifi-
cation performance. First is accuracy which entails precision,
recall and false positive rate. Second is Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC), which shows the change of false posi-
tive rate with respect to true positive rate. Third is scalability
where we evaluate how accuracy changes as we scale from
small to large test datasets. We evaluate the performance of
our method across six different languages so as to demonstrate
its language independence. The evaluation scenario for all
languages consists of the same learning stage on legTrain
and phishTrain (5,567 webpages), being the oldest captured
datasets. Prediction is based on phishTest and each individual
language-specific test dataset of legitimate URLs.
TABLE V: Detailed accuracy evaluation for six languages
Language Pre. Recall F1-score FP Rate AUC
English 0.956 0.958 0.957 0.0005 0.999
French 0.970 0.958 0.964 0.0036 0.997
German 0.981 0.958 0.970 0.0022 0.998
Portuguese 0.967 0.958 0.962 0.004 0.997
Italian 0.982 0.958 0.970 0.0021 0.998
Spanish 0.982 0.958 0.970 0.0021 0.998
Accuracy: The detailed evaluation results for precision, recall
and false positive rate, using legitimate datasets of six different
languages are shown in Table VDetailed accuracy evaluation
for six languagestable.caption.6. These values were obtained
by setting the discrimination threshold of Gradient Boosting
to 0.7, which favors the prediction of legitmate webpages
([0, 0.7[) over phishs ([0.7, 1]). In this table, we see that our
method achieves significantly high precision for all languages
(0.95–0.98). This holds for recall as well (around 0.95). Hence,
the F1-score, which is the harmonic mean of precision and
recall, is also significantly high (0.95–0.97). The false positive
rate is significantly low, i.e., in the range of 0.0005–0.004,
across all languages.
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In many large-scale, real-world scenarios (especially in web
security domain), a machine learning model is considered
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Fig. 3: ROC evaluation results for six languages
usable only if it achieves high precision (e.g., 0.9 or 0.95)
with significant recall (e.g., 0.5 or 0.6) [?]. In order to test
our method against this criterion, we evaluated how recall of
the proposed method changes with precision by varying the
discrimination threshold from 0 to 1. The result is shown in
Fig. 2Precision vs recall evaluationfigure.caption.7 where we
see that when the precision is higher than 0.9, the recall for
all languages is significantly high and is always in the range
of 0.64–0.98. This shows that from the accuracy perspective,
our method is readily applicable in large-scale, multi-lingual
business scenarios.
ROC: Another metric for predictive performance of the pro-
posed method is ROC and corresponding AUC (Area Under
the Curve). Along the lines of accuracy evaluation, we examine
the ROC and AUC metrics across all languages. The objective
of ROC evaluation is to examine the increase in false positive
rate with the increase in true positive rate while varying the
discrimination threshold of the classifier. The evaluation results
for all languages are shown in Fig. 3ROC evaluation results for
six languagesfigure.caption.8. We see that, at the significantly
high true positive rate of 0.9, the false positive rate for all
languages is less than 0.008 which is considered quite low.
As the true positive rate increases to around 0.95, the false
positive rate does not increase much. Even at true positive
rate of 0.98, the false positive rate stays substantially low at
0.02. In line with these results, the AUC is around 0.999 for all
languages, as shown in Table VDetailed accuracy evaluation
for six languagestable.caption.6. Note that these results are
consistent across all languages, which is very desirable in a
multi-lingual phishing detection scenario.
Scalability: We now examine the effect of scale on the
predictive performance of our method, i.e., if the size of the
test dataset increases considerably with time, then what effect
does it have on the precision, recall and false positive rate? We
initialize our test set with 10,000 legitimate and 100 phishing
examples extracted randomly from the English dataset and
phishTest respectively. Thereafter, we iteratively increment the
size of the test set by 10,000 legitimate webpages and 100
phishs randomly picked from the remaining instances of the
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Fig. 4: Performance vs the scale of data
English dataset and phishTest.
The results are shown in Fig. 4Performance vs the scale
of datafigure.caption.9, where we see that precision as well
as recall increase with scale, whereas the false positive rate
decreases. This indicates that the increase in the number of
errors (i.e., false positives and false negatives) is significantly
less than the increase in the size of test set, which causes the
increase in overall precision and recall and decrease in the
false positive rate as we scale up the size of test set. This kind
of predictive performance on large test set, while learning a
model from a small training set, is exactly what is required
in a desirable machine learning model that is deemed fit for
usage in large-scale practical scenarios.
Median Average StDev
Webpage scraping 12787 12798 4898
Loading data 1 2 2
Features extraction 890 1282 1586
Classification < 1 < 1 < 1
Total (no scraping) 891 1283 1588
TABLE VI: Processing time (milliseconds)
Table VIProcessing time (milliseconds)table.caption.10 de-
picts the median, average and standard deviation of the time
taken by each operation involved in phishing webpage classi-
fication on a laptop with 2.7GHz Intel Core i5 processor and
16GB memory. We can see that most of the time is dedicated
to webpage scraping, which is not part of the classification
process in the case of client-side implementation. Except
that, the total median classification time is 891 milliseconds,
showing that the system is able to render a decision in less
than 1 second. These performance figures are based on a stan-
dalone Python prototype. Subsequently, we also implemented
an optimized JavaScript version as a browser add-on which
exhibits better performance characteristics [?].
D. Target Identification
To assess the performance of target identification, we used
the 600 phishing webpages of phishBrand. Since target iden-
tification can provide up to three candidate targets for an ana-
lyzed webpage, we evaluate the likelihood of the correct target
being part of top-1, top-2 and top-3 results provided by our
scheme. Table VIITarget identification resultstable.caption.11
presents the count of correctly identified targets, unknown
targets and missed targets considering these three sets. The last
column gives the success rate of each method. The 17 pages
with unknown target corresponds to webpages including only
some input fields and no hint about the target. We were not
able to infer the target with manual analysis. These webpages
with unknown targets are thus included in the computing of
the success rate. The accuracy of identifying the correct target
(top-1) is 90.5%. If the criteria is identifying the correct target
among a possible set of 3 (top-3) then the accuracy increases
to 97.3%. These results are comparable to the best state of the
art method for target identification [?] that reaches a 92.1%
success rate.
TABLE VII: Target identification results
Targets Identified Unknown Missed Success rate
top-1 526 17 57 90.5%
top-2 558 17 25 95.8%
top-3 567 17 16 97.3%
To see how the target identification system can complement
our phishing detection system we fed the former with misclas-
sified legitimate webpages identified in Section V-CPhishing
Webpage Classificationsubsection.5.3 when assessing phishing
detection with the English dataset. 53 out of 100,000 legitimate
webpages were misclassified. The target identification system
identified four of these as phish with an identified target. 10
were considered as suspicious (no target identified and no
legitimate confirmation) and 39 were confirmed as legitimate.
Considering these results, using the target identification in a
second step for instances identified as phishs by the phishing
detection system can be beneficial. On the English dataset,
it would reduce the false positive rate to 0.0001, which is
equal to the best state-of-the-art phishing detection system
[?]. However, according to accuracy in target identification
(97.3%) it would as well reduce the number of identified
phishs while keeping precision and recall over 0.90.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Relevance of Feature Sets
We have seen in Section V-CPhishing Webpage
Classificationsubsection.5.3 that our features set yielded
results that outperform previous work. The main reason for
this improvement is the new separation scheme applied to
data sources related to their level of control and constraints
(Section III-AModeling Phisher Limitationssubsection.3.1).
Analysing the weight of each features in the learnt
classification model we observed that individually, features
belonging to f2, were the most relevant. We omit details
about feature analysis for lack of space, see our research
report [?] for details. This explains the reason why we
obtained comparable results to the best existing techniques
[?], while relying on less features and training data.
In addition, we assessed that our feature set meets
the requirements introduced in Section IV-AFeature Set
Requirementssubsection.4.1. It has good generalizability be-
ing able to learn a classification model from few thousand
instances and accurately predicting the class of 100,000+
unknown webpages. It is adaptable and language/brand inde-
pendent achieving comparable performances across different
languages. It is usable as it does not rely on online access to
centralized information and is fast to render a decision with a
median processing time lower than 1 second.
B. Limitations
The main strength of our technique, its language indepen-
dence, is though its main weakness. We chose to split strings
according to any characters that are not part of the English
dictionary and to only consider terms composed of at least
three characters to discard stop words and recurrent short
terms having no meaning. This raised some issues in term
distribution comparisons. Long subdomains such as theinstan-
texchange or insuranceservicenow were considered as single
term. In contrast, short domain name string corresponding to
brand and composed of separating characters (digit, hyphen,
etc.) such as dl4a, s2mr or e-go were split and the resulting
terms were discarded as too short. The inconsistent usage
of abbreviations or acronyms like intl for international or
pfa for premier financial online also had a negative impact.
Similarity of synonyms cannot be inferred. Most misclassified
legitimate webpages (>50%) had one of these characteristics.
Despite these misclassifications we achieve a low false positive
rate (0.0005). Many of these misclassified instances can be
identified as legitimate by the target identification system.
A second limitation relates to the identification of some
empty/unavailable webpages and parked domain names as
phishs. The former is explained by the lack of information
contained in empty/unavailable webpages. Several parked do-
main names are domains that have been used for malicious
purposes like phishing [?] and are thus obfuscated FQDNs
registered to trap users. Moreover, parked domain names use
similar composition schemes and obfuscation techniques as
phishing domains [?] such as typosquatting [?]. Parked do-
main names and phishing domain names have other common
characteristics. Parked domains are involved in advertisement
networks [?] and the delivered ad content tends to be correlated
with the domain name parked, for instance ads for Amazon
Inc. are delivered for the RDN amaaon.com. From the point of
view of our classification system, these parked pages have the
same characteristics as phishing pages. This misclassification
of unavailable and parked domain names is not of major
concern since, for the former no content access is prohibited by
the system since the link point empty resources. For the latter,
domain parking is considered as spam by major Internet actors
(e.g. Google) and some efficient state-of-the-art techniques [?]
or the target identification system can be applied to discard
these webpages from phishing identification.
A last limitation was the low accuracy observed in classi-
fication of IP-based phishing URLs. Out of 25 such URLs in
phishTest, only 19 were correctly classified rendering a lower
recall (0.76) than the global recall presented by the system
(>0.95). The reason is that FQDNs based term distributions
for such URLs are empty leading to several null features.
However, such URLs represent less than 2% (41) of the
URLs present in all phishing datasets and is thus not a major
limitation.
Although we did not observe this in our datasets, webpages
whose content is in one alphabet and URL in another may
be misclassified. So far we have only tested webpages in
European languages. Classifier performance on pages in other
languages may be lower.
C. Evasion Techniques
As we saw, one way to evade detection is to use IP-based
URLs. These are less likely to be detected by our system.
However, relying on IP address rather than domain names
deprives phishers from the flexibility brought by the DNS to
change the hosting location of their phishing content while
keeping the same link. Moreover, IP blacklisting is widely
used to prevent access to malicious hosting infrastructure, so
phishers would have to face other issues.
Another evasion technique is to limit the text content avail-
able in a webpage: use few external links, do not load external
content and build short URLs [?]. We observed some of these
techniques actually being used individually in webpages of
both phishing datasets used for evaluation. They did not impact
classifier performance because even though they prevent some
features from being computed, others, such as those based on
title, starting/landing URL and logged links could still lead
to effective detection of phishs. Simultaneous use of multiple
evasion techniques may impact classifier performance. How-
ever, using such subterfuges would impact the quality of the
phishing webpage and reduce the number of victims.
A final probable evasion technique is to use typosquatting
domains and misspelled terms in the different data sources
we analyze. When different but similar terms like paypal,
paypaI or paipal are used in different sources, our distribu-
tions comparison metric would not infer any similarity. The
classifier would thus probably conclude that the webpage is
legitimate. However, the presence of references to the target
would disclose the real target. In addition, misspellings may
tip-off potential victims.
For target identification, the best evasion technique is not
to provide any indication about the target in the webpage and
rather focus on using lures in the message containing the
link to the fake website. But this has two negative effects,
first, the phishing webpage seems less legitimate and second,
the phisher exposes himself to alternative target identification
techniques applied to other content than webpages [?].
VII. RELATED WORK
The obfuscation and mimicry characteristics of phishing
webpages have been the basis of several solutions proposed
for phishing detection and target identification.
Phishing webpage detection: Analysis of the content [?],
[?] and code execution (e.g. the use of javascript, pop-up
Testing set Legitimate Train Leg
Technique Legitimate Phish set /Test /Phish Evaluation FPR Pre. Recall Acc.
Cantina [?] 2,100 19 English - 110/1 no learning 0.03 0.212 0.89 0.969
Cantina+ [?] 1,868 940 several 1/4 2/1 old/new 0.013 0.964 0.955 0.97
Xiang et al. [?] 7,906 3,543 several - 2/1 no learning 0.019 0.957 0.9 0.955
Ma et al. [?] 15,000 20,500 DMOZ 1/1 3/4 cross-valid 0.001 0.998 0.924 0.955
Whittaker et al. [?] 1,499,109 16,967 several 6/1 90/1 old/new 0.0001 0.989 0.915 0.999
Thomas et al. [?] 500,000 500,000 several 4/1 1/1 cross-valid 0.003 0.961 0.734 0.866
Ramesh et al. [?] 1,200 3,374 top Alexa - 1/3 no learning 0.005 0.998 0.996 0.996
Chen et al. [?] 404 1,945 top Alexa 9/1 1/5 cross-valid 0.007 0.992 1 0.994
Our method 100,000 1,216 English 1/18 85/1 old/new 0.0005 0.956 0.958 0.999
Our method 150,000 1,216 several 1/27 125/1 old/new 0.001 0.857 0.958 0.998
TABLE VIII: Phishing detection system performances comparison
windows, etc.) [?] of a webpage provides relevant informa-
tion to identify phishing webpages. Some detection methods
rely on URL lexical obfuscation characteristics [?], [?] and
webpage hosting related features [?], [?] to render a decision
about the legitimacy of a webpage. The visual similarity of a
phishing webpage with its target was also exploited to detect
phishs [?], [?]. Phishing detection based on visual similarity
presuppose that a potential target is known a priori. In contrast,
our approach is to discover the target.
Multi-criteria methods [?], [?] have been proved the most
efficient to detect phishing websites. These techniques use a
combination of webpage features (HTML terms, links, frame,
etc.), connection features (HTML header, redirection, etc.)
and host based features (DNS, IP, ASN, geolocation, etc.) to
infer webpage legitimacy. They are implemented as offline
systems checking content pointed by URLs to automatically
build blacklists. This process induces a delay of several hours
[?] that is problematic in the context of phishing detection,
since phishing attacks have a median lifetime of a few hours
[?]. In addition, it is reportedly costly [?] and use [?] some
proprietary features preventing usage on the end-user devices.
The identification method uses machine learning techniques
fed with hundreds of thousands of features. These features
are mostly static and learned from training sets containing
data such as IP address, Autonomous System Number (ASN),
bag-of-words for different data sources (webpage, URL, etc.).
This limits the generalizability of the approach as it requires
large training datasets, numbering hundreds of thousand of
webpages [?].
Other methods focused, as we do, on the study of terms that
compose the data sources of a webpage [?], [?]. Cantina [?],
[?] was among the first systems to propose a lexical analysis
of terms that compose a webpage. In Cantina [?] key terms
are selected using TF-IDF to provide a unique signature of
a webpage. Using this signature in a search engine, Cantina
infers the legitimacy of a webpage. A similar method [?],
based on TF-IDF and Google search, checks for inconsistency
between a webpage identity and the identity it impersonates
to identify phish. The main difference between these methods
and ours is language independence since these methods rely
on TF-IDF computation to infer their keyterms.
Table VIIIPhishing detection system performances
comparisontable.caption.12 presents comparative
performances results of our phishing detection system
to the most relevant state-of-the-art systems. It presents the
size of the testing sets used to evaluate each system and the
provenance of the legitimate set, showing how representative
the set is. For example, using popular websites (such as top
Alexa sites) [?], [?] as the legitimate set is not representative.
The ratio of training to testing instances indicates the
scalability of the method and the ratio of legitimate to
phishing instances shows the extent to which the experiments
represents a real world distribution (≈ 100/1) [?], [?]. We
also identify the evaluation method (e.g., cross validation vs.
training with old data and testing with new data). Finally,
we present several metrics for assessing the classification
performance. If data for any of the columns were missing
from the original paper describing the system, we estimated
them. For comparison purposes, if several experimental setups
were proposed in a paper, we selected the most relevant to
assess their practical efficacy using the following ordered
criteria:
1) learning and testing instances are different,
2) the ratio of legitimate to phishing in the testing set is
representative of real world observations (≈ 100/1),
3) the learning set is older than the testing set,
4) the false positive rate (FPR) is minimized.
We can see that among the eight most relevant state-of-
the-art techniques, only two [?], [?] have comparable false
positive rates to ours (≤ 0.001). A low false positive rate is
paramount for a phishing detection technique, since this relates
to the proportion of legitimate webpages to which a user will
be incorrectly denied. The technique proposed by Ma et al.
[?] has a lower accuracy than in our system (0.955 < 0.999).
In addition, they use a testing set that does not represent real
world distribution (3 legs/4 phishs) and use a cross-validation
that does not assess scalability of the approach with a 1/1 ratio
for learning to testing instances. Whittaker et al. [?] report
results similar to us in several metrics. However, they use a
huge training set (>9M instances) and their test set is actually
smaller than the training set (a sixth, at 1.5M)! Scalability and
language/brand independence are likely to be poor since they
use 100,000 mostly static features (bag-of-words).
In contrast to the state-of-the-art in phishing detection,
our solution is language independent, scalable, requires much
smaller training sets than test sets, and does not rely on real-
time access to external sources, while performing better than
or as well as the state-of-the-art.
Target identification: One proposal [?] was to use a similar
technique as Cantina with keywords retrieval and Google
search to discover a list of potential target as the top results
of the search, but the authors do not report accuracy figures
for target identification. HREF links have been used to build
community graphs of webpages. By counting the mutual
links between two webpages and further performing visual
similarity analysis between suspicious webpages, Liu et al.
[?] identify the target of a given phishing website with an
accuracy of 92.1%. However, this technique is slow because
of the need to crawl many additional websites to build the
community graph. Conditional Random Fields and Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [?] have been applied to phishing
email content to identify their target [?] with a success rate of
88.1%.
The technique we propose, in contrast to previous tech-
niques is language independent for keyterms inference. It is as
efficient as any state-of-the-art solutions achieving a maximum
success rate of 90.5-97.3%.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented novel techniques for efficiently and economi-
cally identifying phishing webpages and their targets. By using
a set of features that capture inherent limitations that phishers
face, our system has excellent performance and scalability
while requiring much smaller amounts of training data. We
have also implemented a fully client-side phishing prevention
browser add-on implementing this technique [?].
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